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Article 7

The New Judicial Roles in Illinois
Mortgage Foreclosures
Eric T. Freyfogle *
In 1987 Illinois enacted a new mortgage foreclosure law, applicable to all foreclosures commenced after July 1, 1987.1 The new
statute represents the culmination of years of legislative lobbying
and drafting, principally by lending institutions and the state bar
association. The law has two salutary goals: to reduce foreclosure
costs and to increase foreclosure sale prices. These same goals
have prompted a number of states over the past two decades to
modify their foreclosure laws. 2 With its new act, Illinois has followed the move to reform. The Illinois act, however, contains surprisingly novel provisions and heads the state in a direction that is
far different from that chosen by other reform-minded states. The
Illinois route is largely untested, and the coming years should provide a period of experimentation that other states may find instructive, if not inviting.
The route Illinois chose was to expand significantly the role of
courts in supervising the foreclosure sale process. Cutting against
the weight of current thinking, Illinois retained the requirement of
a judicial foreclosure sale and refused to impose any limits on postsale deficiency judgments.3 Further, it reduced, but did not elimi* Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois; B.A., 1973, Lehigh University;
J.D., 1976, University of Michigan. This Article is an expanded version of a report covering the new foreclosure law prepared for the 1987 Illinois Judicial Conference. The
Conference presentation on the new act was made by Judges William T. Caisley and
Anthony J. Scotillo and myself, with assistance from Judges George M. Marovich,
Thomas E. Hornsby, Thomas J. O'Brien, and James C. Murray, and Professor Margit
Livingston of the DePaul University College of Law. Their thoughts and comments, as
well as the comments of the conference participants, aided materially in the preparation
of this Article. Funding for the article was provided by a David C. Baum Research
Grant from the University of Illinois College of Law, for which I am grateful. The normative views expressed in this Article, however, are solely my own.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 15-1101 to 15-1706 (1987). The Act was amended
in several technical ways by Pub. L. 85-907. 1987 Il1. Legis. Serv. 85-907, Art. I, sec. I
(West). All references to the Act as amended are made hereafter simply by paragraph
number as codified in Chapter 110 of the Illinois Revised Statutes.
2. A summary of recent statutory changes, particularly changes in judicial foreclosure and statutory redemption rights, is set forth in Bauer, JudicialForeclosureand Statutory Redemption: The Soundness of Iowa's Traditional Preferencefor Protection over
Credit, 71 IowA L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1985).
3. Paras. 15-1404 and 15-1405 (requiring judicial foreclosure and prohibiting the ex-
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nate, the post-sale statutory redemption period.4 At the core of the
Illinois reform effort are provisions authorizing greater judicial
flexibility in managing the foreclosure process and conducting the
sale.' No longer must sales be conducted by public auction with
purchasers given little chance to inspect the property and its title,
and no opportunity to submit bids with financing and other contingencies. Now, brokers can be used, and property can be sold in
ways that approximate the usual processes of selling
nonforeclosure property. The judge must now decide the best
method of sale, a new task that presents attractive opportunities
but that threatens serious new burdens. The new law requires that
judges determine, among other things, whether a defaulting mortgagor can redeem more than once,6 whether a mortgagee can seize
and retain the property instead of selling it,7 and whether a lease
junior to a foreclosing mortgage will survive a foreclosure sale.'
The new judicial roles are both numerous and critical.
Taken together, these new judicial roles could dramatically
change the once formal and routine foreclosure process. Judges
now must examine individual cases more closely and make important choices. Their task is made more burdensome by the nearly
total lack of statutory guidelines to use in making these decisions.
In every key area in which judges are placed in a new role, the
statute is silent on the standards that will govern. It is likely that
confusion will accompany the extra burdens, at least until appellate decisions provide some guidance.
ercise of power of sale clauses in mortgages). The Act, however, authorizes certain transactions outside the judicial foreclosure scheme. See,e.g., para. 15-1401 (authorizing deeds
taken in lieu of foreclosure); para. 15-1402 (authorizing consent foreclosure in which the
mortgagor agrees to turn over the property to the mortgagee in full satisfaction of the
debt); para. 15-1403 (authorizing common law strict foreclosure to the extent such foreclosure was "in existence in Illinois on the effective date of this Article"). Strict foreclosure occurs when a court sets a date by which the mortgagor must redeem; in the
absence of redemption, the mortgagee takes the property with no obligation to conduct a
foreclosure sale. G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 7.9,
7.10 (2d ed. 1985). According to the leading and most recent decision, strict foreclosure
is allowed in Illinois when (1) the mortgagor is insolvent, (2) the property is worth less
than the debt, and (3) the mortgagee consents to waive any deficiency. See Great Lakes
Mortgage Corp. v. Collymore, 14 Ill. App. 3d 68, 302 N.E.2d 248 (1st Dist. 1973). See
infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
4. Para. 15-1604 (setting thirty-day post-sale redemption period for a residential
mortgagor when the mortgagee buys the property at the foreclosure sale at less than the
amount that the mortgagor would have needed to redeem).
5. Paras. 15-1506 and 15-1507.
6. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 21-35, 36-55, 56-59 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
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By its new law, Illinois has chosen to improve foreclosures by
giving courts greater flexibility to fashion the right process in each
case, a process that provides fairness for the mortgagor and that
ultimately produces the best sale price. On the surface the approach seems sound, but in operation the troubles could prove considerable. The absence of standards will add undesirable
unpredictability to the foreclosure process. But the bigger difficulty stems from the realities of life in today's clogged foreclosure
courts. The foreclosure docket is crowded, especially in Chicago
and neighboring counties. Judges have little time to reflect judiciously on the best way of selling each particular parcel. The
crowding may be less elsewhere, but the new roles and burdens
may fit no better into the foreclosure scheme. Flexibility, after all,
is productive only if judges have the time to exercise it wisely. Today they often have time only to skim through the papers in the
typical uncontested foreclosure action.
The key issue, then, is whether the legislature has placed too
great a burden on foreclosure judges. Most foreclosure actions are
uncontested, and judges process them with minimal effort. But the
new law, if it is to prove effective, will require considerable judicial
attention, even in the uncontested case. The judge's job now will
be to ensure that the sale process is productive. If judges abdicate
that role in most cases, the new act may achieve little.
This Article considers the major provisions of the new Illinois
mortgage foreclosure law (the "IMFL"). It examines the new
rules regarding redemptions, waiver of redemption rights, liability
of guarantors for judgments in foreclosure actions, future advances
lending, and nonrecord claimants. It also examines the confusing
new provisions governing the applicability of the IMFL to installment land contracts and collateral assignments of land trust beneficial interests. Its particular focus, however, is on the several new
provisions that create new roles and burdens for judges. After examining these roles and the vagaries that surround them, the Article offers some observations on the underlying wisdom of the roles
and on how courts should respond to them.
I.

REFORMING MORTGAGE LAW

Modifying foreclosure procedures has been a regular pastime of
legislators in the twentieth century.9 Foreclosure procedures first
9. A portion of the history of mortgage foreclosure law may be found in G. NELSON
& D. WHITMAN, supra note 3, at §§ 1.1-1.7, and in Bauer, supra note 2, at 14-72.
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were developed by courts sitting in equity.' 0 Before long, however,
legislatures intervened. Sympathy for beleaguered home-owners
and farm-owners prompted many of the early foreclosure statutes.
Many statutes granted a defaulting mortgagor the right to redeem
his property during a specified period of time after the foreclosure
sale.II Other statutes, frequently used during the depression years
of the 1930's, placed moratoria on foreclosures and limited the
power of mortgagees to obtain post-foreclosure deficiency judg2
ments against defaulting mortgagors.'
According to many observers, the cumulative effect of these
well-intended laws, contrary to legislative expectations, was to increase the costs and delays of foreclosures and to diminish ultimate
foreclosure sale prices.1 3 Observers most often criticized the postsale statutory redemption period. The extra redemption right was
designed to protect mortgagors from unreasonably low foreclosure
sale prices by giving them the chance to redeem after the foreclosure sale. Supporters of these laws anticipated that the threat of
such a redemption would prompt purchasers to bid a fair price. In
practice, however, the benefits proved elusive. Indeed, according
to many critics, the laws actually reduced sale prices because the
sale purchaser felt constrained by the redemption law to wait until
the end of the redemption period before using the property. With
the delay in taking effective control and the possibility of a redemption lingering on, the purchaser was unwilling to buy the property
at a price close to its fair market value. Some states aggravated the
purchaser's plight further by granting the defaulting mortgagor the
right to remain in possession, rent-free, during the entire statutory
4
redemption period.'
Despite the inconclusive evidence that statutory redemption periods offered benefits, dozens of states adopted them. In recent
years, however, the prevailing winds have changed directions. Redemption statistics showed that mortgagors rarely redeemed, particularly during the post-sale redemption periods. Faced with this
evidence, states began reducing or eliminating statutory redemption rights in their never ending quests to increase foreclosure sale
10. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 3, at § 1.3.
11. Id. at §§ 8.4-8.8.
12. Id. at § 8.3.
13. The conflicting evidence is surveyed in Bauer, supra note 2, at 72-81, which also
contains references to most of the principal studies of the subject. See also G. NELSON &
D. WHITMAN, supra note 3, at § 8.8.
14. See Ropfogel v. Enegren, 7 Kan. App. 2d 644, 646 P.2d 1138 (1982); Cross Companies, Inc. v. Citizens Mortgage Investment Trust, 305 Minn. 111, 232 N.W.2d 114
(1975). See also G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 3, at § 8.4.
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prices.'" The goal became cheaper, more expeditious foreclosure
procedures on the theory that they would yield the highest net sale
price. As the reform movement gained momentum, states also began to question their cumbersome judicial sale processes. Many
states decided to let mortgagees use power-of-sale clauses that authorized foreclosure sales by nonjudicial process. 16 The guiding
thought behind this sanctioning of nonjudicial sales was that
prompt, low-cost foreclosure sales would increase net sale proceeds
and thereby ultimately aid mortgagors, or at least the great majority of mortgagors who had no ability to redeem.
It was against this backdrop that Illinois undertook to amend its
mortgage foreclosure rules. State after state had authorized powerof-sale foreclosures and had eliminated statutory redemption periods. As a protection to defaulting mortgagors, many states had
also added limits on deficiency judgments to reduce the harmful
effects on a mortgagor when a sale failed to cover the accumulated
indebtedness. In 1986, when the legislature addressed the latest
legislative proposal on foreclosure, Illinois stood with the distinct
minority of states that (1) required judicial foreclosure, (2) retained
a material statutory redemption period, and (3) placed no limits on
deficiencies.
The law that emerged from the Illinois legislature remained
close to the old foreclosure scheme, even though it amended many
of the particulars. The drafters believed that power-of-sale foreclosures would represent too drastic a departure from the long-standing Illinois commitment to judicial foreclosure, an odd
determination in light of the fact that so many states had made the
transition successfully. The drafters also showed no interest in enacting an anti-deficiency rule. The only major shift was in the near
elimination of statutory redemption rights. The IMFL contains
lengthy rules that purport to grant to mortgagors, but not to other
interested parties, extensive redemption rights. But, as explained
below, the redemption periods provided by the IMFL operate almost entirely before the foreclosure sale, and therefore merely duplicate the pre-existing, and continuing, equitable rights of
redemption.' 7 Only a narrow category of residential mortgagors
still have a post-sale redemption right, and that right is much
15. See Bauer, supra note 2, 3-5 (noting that the number of states requiring judicial
foreclosure dropped from twenty-eight to nineteen, and the states authorizing statutory
redemption from nineteen to eleven, between 1924 and 1984).
16. See generally G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 3, at §§ 7.1-7.32.
17. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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shorter than under the old law. Thus, statutory redemption rights
largely have disappeared.
II.

COVERAGE OF THE NEW LAW

Among the more vaguely written provisions of the IMFL are
those that explain the types of security arrangements that must be
foreclosed under the statute. Because of these vagaries, judges will
play an important role in deciding when the IMFL governs.
The IMFL applies to all mortgage foreclosures commenced after
July 1, 1987, regardless of the date of the mortgage."8 Regrettably,
the new law provides no guidance on what is a "mortgage" for
purposes of the IMFL. Courts sitting in equity, however, have
guarded jealously the rights of mortgagors and have applied mortgage law to any arrangement functionally equivalent to a mortgage.' 9 Over the years, shrewd lenders have tried all manners of
formal arrangements in the hope of depriving borrowers of redemption and other rights that they enjoy under mortgage law.
With few exceptions, Illinois courts have ignored the form of a
transaction and have applied mortgage law to any arrangement
that was a mortgage in substance. 20
A. Installment Land Contracts
One mortgage substitute that traditionally has remained outside
mortgage law is the installment land contract.2 ' For years states
viewed the installment land contract as a distinct financing arrangement not governed by the protective rules of mortgage law.
Over the past decade and a half, however, several states have
shifted direction and now require foreclosure of installment coniracts. 2 Other states have severely restricted the availability of
forfeiture, the installment vendor's traditional remedy, and in various ways now delay and manipulate the vendor's remedies to give
18. Para. 15-1106.
19. See G. NELSON & D.

WHrMAN,

supra note 3, §§ 3.1-3.38; Licht, The Clog in

the Equity of Redemption and Its Effect on Modern Real Estate Finance, 60 ST. JOHNS L.
REV. 452 (1986).

20. See Cunningham & Tischler, Disguised Real Estate Security Transactions as
Mortgages in Substance, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1972).

21. An installment contract is an arrangement whereby the purchaser pays for the
p, operty in installments over a period of at least one year. The purchaser typically takes
possession immediately but receives a deed only after completing all or nearly all of the
payments. See 7 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 938.201] (1987).
22. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § I IA (1981); Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky.

1979); Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
921 (1974).
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the defaulting purchaser a chance to complete payment of the contract. 3 Several states have granted purchasers the right to reinstate the contract, a right that allows them to keep the property
simply by paying the past due installments rather than the entire
unpaid balance.24 A growing number of states allow the purchaser
to obtain restitution of the amount by which his installment payments have exceeded the vendor's damages."
Illinois never has viewed an installment land contract as the
functional equivalent of a mortgage, and it has been slow to extend
to defaulting purchasers many of thi' special protections that purchasers in other states enjoy. 26 Illiaiois is strict, however, in requiring vendors to follow forfeiture procedures exactly, and is quick to
find that a vendor has waived his right to insist on prompt payment
by accepting late payments in the past. The only material statutory protection offered to Illinois purchasers is the Forcible Entry
and Detainer Act 28 (the "FED"). The FED Act requires courts to
delay the enforcement of forfeiture orders while the purchaser tries
to reinstate the contract. 29 The length of the delay increases when
the purchaser has paid a greater proportion of the total contract
price and, therefore, has more to lose from a forfeiture.30 The Illinois approach to installment contracts has been criticized by commentators who contend that this approach unduly favors
vendors.3
The new mortgage law contains language that, on its face, seems

to aid purchasers by requiring installment vendors in some cases to
undergo foreclosure instead of declaring a forfeiture. The act requires foreclosure of residential installment land contracts when
(1) the purchase price is to be paid over more than five years,
(2) the unpaid principal at the time of filing of foreclosure is less
than eighty percent of the original purchase price, and (3) the con23.
24.
25.
26.

See
See
See
An

7 POWELL, supra note 21, at 1938.22.
id. at 1938.23[3].
id. at 1938.23[4].
excellent survey of Illinois law is set forth in Note, Installment Land Con-

tracts: The Illinois Experience and the Difficulties of Incremental Judicial Reform, 1986
U. ILL. L. REV. 91.
27. See 7 POWELL supra note 21, at 84D-91 to 84D-92; Note, supra note 26, at 10306.
28. Paras. 9-101 to 9-116 (1987).
29. See Para. 9-110; Note, supra note 26, at 102.
30. Para. 9-110 (up to sixty days' stay if the purchase has more than seventy-five
percent of the original purchase price yet to pay; a stay of one hundred and eighty days is
required if less than seventy-five percent is due, unless the vendor shows good cause why
a shorter period is appropriate).
31. See 7 POWELL, supra note 21, at 1 938.23[5]; Note, supra note 26, at 115-24.
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tract is executed on or after July 1, 1987.32 When these tests are
met, the purchaser is treated as the equivalent of a mortgagor and
enjoys all the protections afforded mortgagors by the IMFL.
The statutory language seems to represent a step toward increased sympathy for defaulting purchasers. In operation, however, very few contracts are likely to fall within the three-part
definition. The second requirement will exclude most contracts,
and forfeiture will remain the more common remedy.33 Indeed, in
a case in which the unpaid portion is slightly less than eighty percent of the original price, a vendor might simply wait for the unpaid interest on a contract to mount, thereby avoiding the need to
foreclose. The eighty percent figure may prove simple to use, but it
otherwise possesses little virtue. The most significant defect is that
the calculation ignores improvements made to the property by the
purchaser and equity that comes about by way of inflation in home
prices. Accordingly, even with the eighty percent test, a purchaser
can lose far more than twenty percent of the original purchase
price. Further, the statute excludes commercial installment contracts, even if less than eighty percent is owed. In short, the new
statutory language does little to deal with the significant shortcomings of Illinois installment contract law.
Fortunately, courts still have authority to deal with these deficiencies. The new statute does nothing to inhibit further judicial
efforts to protect the defaulting purchaser whose circumstances
seem to warrant equitable intervention. The IMFL retains the old
equitable rules as to what constitutes a mortgage. Specifically, the
IMFL includes, within the definition of a mortgage, all "equitable
mortgages" 34 and all "instruments which would have been deemed
instruments in the nature of a mortgage prior to the effective date
of this amendatory act of 1987."' "3Thus, room still exists, notwithstanding the statute, for an Illinois court to follow the lead of other
states and conclude that a particular contract is tantamount to a
mortgage. In cases in which foreclosure is not required, courts can
continue to refine the rights of purchasers in particular settings by
32. Para. 15-1106(a)(2).
33. Statistical evidence on this point is unavailable, but a review of hundreds of reported decisions revealed few in which the purchaser at the time of trial had less than
eighty percent of the original purchase price to pay. Many purchasers had paid in excess

of twenty percent of the original price, but interest by t.he time of trial typically had
accumulated to the point where the amount unpaid wa, again in excess of the eighty
percent line.
34.

Para. 15-1207(d).

35.

Para. 15-1207(e).
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creating for them rights of restitution and greater rights of redemption and reinstatement.
The new statute fails to resolve the tough conflict between the
interests of installment vendors and those of installment purchasers. The statute leaves room for courts to act, yet fails to provide
any governing standards. Judges might be pleased at the willingness of the legislature to defer to their collective judgment, but the
task of reconciling these conflicting interests remains a difficult

one.
B.

Land Trust Interests

An equally troubling task for courts will lie in determining when
a collateral assignment of a land trust beneficial interest should be
treated as a mortgage. Vast amounts of Illinois land are held in the
peculiar arrangement known nationally as the Illinois land trust.
Under this arrangement the trustee holds both legal and equitable
title to the real property, and the beneficiary's interest is viewed as
personalty. Lenders today often forgo taking mortgages on land
trust property and instead secure their loans with Article 9 security
interests 37 in the beneficiary's personal property interest in the
trust.38 When this is allowed, the lender has all of the rights of a
secured party under Article 9 of the UCC,39 including the right to
take possession of the property promptly upon a default and the
36. See In re Estate of Albert, 95 II!. 2d 377, 447 N.E.2d 796 (1983). See generally H.
KENOE, KENOE ON LAND TRUSTS

(1981); Haswell & Levine, The Illinois Land Trust:

A FictionalBest Seller, 33 DE PAUL L. REv. 277 (1984); Note, Is the Land Trust Truly a
Trust: - Gift Tax and BroaderImplications, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 503, 505.
37. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code supplies the rules that apply when an
owner of personal property grants to a lender or seller a security interest in the property
to secure a debt. U.C.C. § 9-101 Official Comment. The Article describes the relative
rights of the debtor and the creditor, including the rights of a creditor to seize and to sell
the personal property when the debtor defaults. In general, the debtor's rights under
Article 9 are far less than those under mortgage law. See infra note 41.
38. When an Illinois land trust is created, the trustee receives both kc.al and equitable
title to the real property, and the beneficiary holds simply a peroal property interest.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Albert, 95 Ill. 2d 377, 447 N.E.2d 796 (1983); Home Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n. of Chicago v. Zarkin, 89 Ill. 2d 232, 432 N,E.2d 841 (1982).
Because the beneficial interest is viewed as personal property, a security interest in that
property would be governed by Article 9 rather than mortgage law. The beneficiary for
all intents and purposes is the owner of the real property, and it is a fiction for the law to
assume otherwise. If this fiction is ignored and the beneficiary is viewed as the holder of
an interest in real property, the security interest granted by the beneficiary would attach
to real property, and mortgage law would govern.
39. Those rights are considered iii J. WHITE &. R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ch.

26 (2d ed. 1980).
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right to sell the property at a private sale. 40 The defaulting borrower under Article 9 has far fewer rights than does the defaulting
mortgagor.41
At first glance, this land trust arrangement would seem to be a
prime target for the aged, but still viable, equitable rule that treats
as a mortgage any security arrangement that is a mortgage in substance. The Illinois Supreme Court applied this equitable rule in
the context of land trusts in Homey v. Hayes,42 a 1957 decision. In
that case, the court listed the principal factors that it believed distinguished a legitimate personal property security arrangement
from a mortgage.43 Unfortunately, Homey has proven a confusing
precedent to follow, and its language for years pushed lower courts
in conflicting directions. In the past few years, Illinois courts
largely have joined ranks in giving Homey a narrow reading. As a
consequence, few, if any, land trust security arrangements today
are viewed as mortgages."
The new act deals with this issue by requiring that certain land
trust arrangements be *-eated as mortgages. Section 15-1106(a)(3)
of the law includes as a mortgage any collateral assignment made
on or after July 1, 1987, if several conditions are met: (1) the trust
arose contemporaneously with the assignment, (2) the secured
creditor required the assignment, and (3) the assignment gives the
40. See Homey v. Hayes, 11 111. 2d 178, 142 N.E.2d 94 (1957); Haswell & Levine,
supra note 36, at 301-04.
41. The rights of a defaulting borrower under Article Nine and Illinois mortgage law
are compared in I-reyfogle, Land Trusts and the Decline of Mortgage Law, 1988 U. ILL.
L. REV.
-.
42. 11 Ill. 2d 178, 142 N.E.2d 94 (1957). In Horney, a party created a land trust with
himself as a beneficiary and transferred property to the trust. Some eighteen months
later, the beneficiary assigned his beneficial interest to a creditor to secure a short-term
loan. The security agreement governing the assignment gave the secured party the right
to seize and sell the beneficial interest upon default. On these facts the court concluded
tL L Article 9 applied rather than mortgage law.
43. The court identified four factors: (1) whether the parties intended to create a
mortgage; (2) whether the security agreement provided for the sale of the estate (rather
than simply the beneficial interest) upon default; (3) whether the trust was created for the
purpose of arranging security for the debt; and (4) whether the trust was created at the
same time as the security arrangement. Id. at 184, 142 N.E.2d at 97; Freyfogle, supra
note 41.
44. See Slovick v. All American Bank of Chicago, 163 Ill. App. 3d 741, 516 N.E.2d
947 (1st Dist. 1987); Interstate Electric Supply Co. v. Contractors & Engineers, Inc., 161
Ill. App. 3d 676, 515 N.E.2d 182 (1st Dist 1987); Commercial Nat'l Bank of Chicago v.
Hazel Manor Condominiums, 139 Ill. App. 3d 644, 462 N.E.2d 741 (lst Dist. 1985);
Sheridan v. Park. Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 97 Ill. App. 3d 589, 422 N.E.2d 1130 (lst. Dist.
1981); First Federal Savings and Loan v. Pogue, 72. Ill. App. 3d 54, 389 N.E.2d 652 (2d
Dist. 1979); Freyfogle, supra note 41.
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creditor the right to sell the real estate to satisfy the debt.45 The
language of the statute generally tracks that of Homey except that
the statute ignores one of the four Homey tests-whether the parties intended to create a mortgage relationship." In repeating the
Homey tests, however, the drafters altered the tests, and did so in a
way that virtually eliminates all collateral assignments from the
express coverage of the law. The Homey court suggested that a
collateral assignment amounted to a mortgage if one of the four
factors was present. 47 A few intermediate-level decisions subsequent to Horney agreed.48 Some subsequent decisions, on the other
hand, concluded that the four factors required examination as a
whole, with no single factor determinative.49 No decision, however, has been so restrictive as to say that all factors must point in
the direction of a mortgage before mortgage law will apply. The
IMFL, therefore, provides the most restrictive test yet.
In any event, a reexamination of the issue by the Illinois
Supreme Court seems likely. The current, rather confused state of
the law was recently questioned by Judge Harlington Wood, Jr., of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, who
suspected in a recent case that a lender was out to undercut a
debtor's redemption and homestead rights.50 Wood concluded that
Illinois mortgage law did not apply in light of recent Illinois decisions, but he commented gratuitously that "[i]t [would] not be surprising... if there continues to be further refinement in the Illinois
5
law of land trusts." '
The language of the new statute is particularly restrictive because of the requirement that the secured party have the right
upon a default to sell the real estate. This requirement will rarely,
if ever, be met. Few assignments, therefore, will satisfy this threepart test. A security arrangement executed under Article 9 of the
UCC gives the secured party the right to sell, not the real estate,
45. Para. 15-1106(a)(3).
46. The intent element, and the inherent difficulties that arise in attempting to apply
it, are considered in Freyfogle, supra note 41.
47. Homey, 11 111. 2d at 124, 142 N.E.2d at 97.
48. See Landino v. American Nat'l Bank of South Chicago Heights, 120 Ill.
App. 3d
740, 45F N.E.2d 1070 (1st Dist. 1983); Shefner v. University Nat'l Bank, 40 Il.App. 3d
978, 353 N.E.2d 126 (ist Dist. 1976); Quinn v. Pullman Trust & Savings Bank, 98 111.
App. 2d 402, 240 N.E.2d 791 (1st Dist. 1968).
49. See Commercial Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Hazel Manor Condominiums, 139 Ill.
App. 3d 644, 487 N.E.2d 1145 (lst Dist. 1985); Melrose Park Nat'l Bank v. Melrose Park
Nat'l Bank, as Trustee, 123 11. App. 3d 282, 462 N.E.2d 741 (1st Dist. 1984).
50. Capitol Bank & Trust v. Fasetta, 771 F.2d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir. 1985).

51. Id.
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but the beneficial land trust interest.5 2 Once a purchaser buys an
entire beneficial interest, he can instruct the trustee to dissolve the
trust and thereby take title to the property. But a secured lender
cannot seize the real estate directly. Indeed, if a security agreement gave a secured party such a right, the agreement would need
to be a true mortgage signed by the trustee. Only the trustee can
grant to a lender the power to seize the real estate upon default; a
beneficiary signing an Article 9 agreement cannot do so. Read literally, the new statutory language would exclude from the definition of a mortgage any Article 9 security interest that was created
in proper form so as to give the secured party simply the right to
seize the beneficial interest. In short, the language seems to provide
a strong blow to the functional equivalence doctrine 3 in mortgage
law, and provides to secured lenders their long-sought-after means
to circumvent the heretofore mandatory provisions of mortgage
law.
Again, however, it is critical to realize that the new statute maintains the equitable rules on what constitutes a mortgage. In many
cases courts can, and probably should, conclude that a land trust
arrangement is tantamount to a mortgage and must be foreclosed,
even though the arrangement does not fit within the narrow statutory language. Nothing in the language or history of the new act
casts any doubt as to the continuing propriety of this judicial role.
As with installment land contracts, therefore, courts must resolve
the difficult conflict between the interests of the borrowers and the
interests of the lenders, with no helpful statutory guidance.
Homey suggests that the application of mortgage law can be determined only case-by-case after a careful factual inquiry. The burden on the courts, therefore, remains considerable.
A related difficulty that arises undcr the new act is in determining exactly what is being sold at a foreclosure sale involving land
trust property. If a collateral assignment of a beneficial interest is
treated as a mortgage, can the mortgagee force a sale of the real
estate? The power to do so arguably is supported by the IMFL,
which defines a mortgage as a consensual lien that grants an interest in real estate.5 4 Upon reflection, however, it should seem clear
to courts that a mortgagee has no such power. An illuminating
example is provided by the case in which there are multiple beneficiaries, only one of whom is in default on a separate note. The
52.

See, e.g., Shefner v. University Nat'l Bank, 40 III. App. 3d 978, 353 N.E.2d 126

(Ist Dist. 1976).
53. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
54. Para. 15-1207.
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secured lender should have the right to reach the individual beneficiary's interest, but should have no power to reach the real estate.
One of the benefits of a properly drawn land trust arrangement is
that it largely eliminates the power of one of several beneficiaries to
disrupt title to the real estate to the detriment of the other beneficiaries.3 5 One beneficiary should have no power to grant a security
interest that gives the secured lender a chance to seize or to sell the
real property itself. Thus, when a court decides that foreclosure is
required, it should make clear that the item being sold is the beneficial interest rather than the real estate itself, unless all parties
otherwise agree.
C. DiscretionaryApplication
Section 15-1106 allows secured parties to seek foreclosure under
circumstances in which the new act on its face does not appear to
mandate it. Subsection (b) authorizes foreclosure in the case of
(1) a collateral assignment of a land trust beneficial interest that is
not otherwise covered by the statute, and (2) a security assignment
of a buyer's interest in a real estate installment contract, but in
each case only if the security interest is created on or after July 1,
1987. Subsection (c) authorizes application of the new act by any
installment contract vendor if the contract was entered into on or
after July 1, 1987. These provisions should create few problems for
courts, at least so long as courts construe them with care.
One misinterpretation of section 15-1106 could bring about a
major, unintended change in Illinois law. Under established Illinois law, a buyer's interest under an installment land contract is a
real property interest.5 6 When a buyer grants a security assignment in that real property interest, he creates a mortgage, not an
Article 9 security interest, regardless of the language of the documentation that is used. Courts around the country commonly allow installment purchasers to grant mortgages in their interests, at
57
least when the buyer's interest is not economically insignificant.
Thus, a security interest in a buyer's installment contract interest
should almost always be viewed as a mortgage, with foreclosure
required under the new law. Courts should ignore the implication
of the statutory language that application of the new law is somehow discretionary with the secured party.
55.
56.
known
57.

See H. KENOE, supra note 36, at §§ 3.3-3.8.
See e.g., Shay v. Penrose, 25 Ill. 2d 447, 185 N.E.2d 218 (1962). This law is
as the doctrine of equitable conversion.
7 POWELL supra note 21, at 938.26[2] (1987).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

A second possible misinterpretation of section 15-1106 is that it
somehow prohibits foreclosure under the act in the case of installment contracts executed before July 1, 1987. Foreclosure is an option that all vendors should possess, and courts have good policy
reasons to encourage foreclosure over forfeiture.58 Illinois courts
have never decided expressly whether installment vendors can
foreclose. Despite this lack of precedent, there is little reason to
think that Illinois vendors lacked the remedy prior to the IMFL.
The IMFL expressly authorizes foreclosure only for post-July 1,
1987 contracts. This limit, however, seems insignificant absent
either an express ban on foreclosure for earlier contracts or some
policy reason to imply a ban. The better interpretation is that the
legislature gave no thought to the foreclosure of earlier contracts.
When courts do so, they should allow foreclosure.
A final caution on section 15-1106 is that its language on Illinois
land trusts could suggest that a secured lender somehow has the
option of treating its Article 9 interest as a mortgage on the real
property and forcing a foreclosure sale of the realty. As noted
above, a beneficiary technically has no power to encumber the title
or to transfer an interest in the realty. 59 The beneficiary's only
power is to encumber the personal property interest and to grant to
a lender the right to seize the personalty. Having agreed to this
limited security interest, the lender should not have the power unilaterally to convert the interest into some right to reach the realty.

III.

THREE NEW JUDICIAL ROLES

The most visible new role for foreclosure judges will be in determining the best method of conducting foreclosure sales. That new
role and its implications are discussed in the next section of this
Article. This section takes up three other, more limited roles that
the IMFL places on judges, roles of critical importance to various
participants in the foreclosure process. In each case judges must
perform the role with no legislative guidance.
A. Reinstatement Rights
One new task for judges is to determine when a defaulting mort58. The principal defects of forfeiture, however, are all ones that can be easily remedied. Once reformed, forfeiture law offers many advantages over foreclosure, principally
the advantage that it retains the installment land contract as a viable alternative to traditional mortgage financing. See Freyfogle, Vagueness and the Rule of Law: Reconsidering
Installment Land Contract Forfeitures, 1988 DUKE L.J. 59. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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gagor can reuse his statutory reinstatement right. 60 The new law
largely continues the prior law on the mortgagor's ability to reinstate a mortgage loan that is in default. But minor particulars have
changed, in large part to the benefit of mortgagors.
The old Illinois statute provided a reinstatement period that began upon default and that extended until the earlier of (1) ninety
days after the commencement of the foreclosure action and (2) entry of a judgment of foreclosure. 6' The new law extends the reinstatement period for ninety days "from the date the court obtains
jurisdiction over the mortgagor," without regard to when the foreclosure judgment, or even the foreclosure sale, occurs.62
More significantly, the new law provides that the mortgagor
cannot again use his reinstatement right for five years "if the court
has made an express written finding that the mortgagor has exercised its right to reinstate pursuant to this Section. ' 63 The language is intriguing. The reference to "the court" presumably
means the court that heard the first foreclosure action, which
means that a later court cannot reconsider the issue and decide
that, in some earlier action, the mortgagor exercised his right to
reinstate and therefore cannot use it again. This interpretive conclusion, however, is not free from doubt.
Of greater interest is the fact that the statute provides i.a guidance on when the court should make such a finding. The mere
fact that a court must make a finding suggests quite plainly that a
court will have some discretion in the matter. 64 A court, it would
seem, need not enter such a finding simply because the mortgagor
has reinstated and the mortgagee has asked for the finding.
Clearly, something more should be required, something that
amounts in substance to a showing of good cause to bar the mortgagor from reinstating again for five years.
One issue a court might consider in deciding to make a requested finding is whether the mortgagor had adequate notice of
the possible foreclosure and adequate chance to cure. Mortgage
law, even under the new statute, does not require a mortgagee to
give notice before starting a foreclosure action (although mortgage
documents often do contain such a requirement). Thus, a court
60.
61.
62.
63.

Para. 15-1602.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, para. 57 (1985) (repealed).
Para. 15-1602.
Id.

64. The old law applied mechanically and required no judicial finding. ILL. REv.
STAT.

ch. 95, para. 57 (1985) (repealed).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

might refuse to make a requested finding if, before commencement
of the action, the mortgagor did not have a full chance to cure.
A court also might consider how quickly the mortgagor offered
to cure, and how much trouble the mortgagee experienced as a
result. It also might be relevant for the court to consider the mortgagor's prior payment history and whether the mortgagee had been
asked to accept numerous late payments in the past.65 Finally, a
court might show greater solicitude for residential mortgagors over
commercial ones.
A court asked to find that reinstatement has occurred might
show particular sympathy toward a mortgagor if the default relates, not to a payment of principal and interest, but to some other
obligation of the mortgagor, such as the payment of an escrow
amount or some obligation relating to the use of the property. In
these areas, good faith disputes easily can arise, and the mortgagor
should not face a penalty for challenging in good faith some position asserted by the mortgagee. In general, courts should favor a
mortgagor acting in good faith and should refuse to issue a requested finding. It is worth remembering that reinstatement typically is not harmful to the mortgagee, particularly because a
reinstating mortgagor must pay any reasonable default charges as
well as correct the default.66 In any event, judges have discretion
in issuing a finding of reinstatement, whatever standard is used,
and can make a finding as equity seems to require.
Courts must be sensitive to the procedures that they employ, as
well as to the substantive standards, when they decide whether to
enter a requested finding that a mortgagor has reinstated. In many
cases the mortgagee will seek a finding when the mortgagor is not
represented or even present in the case. The typical request for a
finding will come as part of the mortgagee's motion for an entry of
dismissal or nonsuit. The mortgagor may not have filed an appearance in the case and may have no lawyer, particularly if he cleared
up the default soon after the action began. Is it fair for a court to
enter a requested finding with no notice to the mortgagor and no
hearing on the issue? An inquiry seems needed before a finding is
entered, for a full presentation of relevant equitable considerations
is essential. But a hearing requirement would force courts to delay
65. Courts commonly consider this factor in deciding whether an installment land
contract vendor has waived his right to insist on prompt payment by accepting late payments in the past. See Note, supra note 26, at 105-06.

66. Para. 15-1602 (requires payment of "all costs and expenses required by the mortgage to be paid in the event of such defaults").
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dismissal while examining the equities of the situation. If time is
short, it seems, the ruling should favor the mortgagor.
In many instances a mortgagor will have a reinstatement right in
his mortgage contract. A question that courts will need to decide
is whether a mortgagor who has exercised a reinstatement right
under his contract has concurrently exhausted his one reinstatement right under the statute. The statute provides no answer to
the question, but the likely answer is that the statutory right will be
used only if no contract right exists at the time of reinstatement.
Mortgage documents and mortgage laws traditionally are interpreted to favor mortgagors, and this ambiguity probably will be
resolved similarly. Only if no contract right exists, will the mortgagor be charged with using his statutory right.
On a final point relating to reinstatement, courts will need to
decide whether a mortgagor can reinstate twice within five years if
the first reinstatement occurred under the old statute. The old
statute, again, required no judicial finding to bar reuse of the reinstatement right within five years. Accordingly, courts had no
particular reason to enter a finding that reinstatement had occurred. The new statute is silent on this transition issue. Presumably, courts will interpret the statute as giving rise to a new
reinstatement right to all mortgagors, even those who have recently reinstated, if only because of their usual tendency to interpret mortgage laws to favor mortgagors. A liberal reading of this
new reinstatement provision is appropriate. As noted below, the
new act materially reduces the post-sale redemption rights held by
current mortgagors. A pro-mortgagor application of the reinstatement rules would help offset this serious reduction in rights.
B.

Consent Foreclosure

A second new role for judges is contained in the provisions governing consent foreclosure. In consent foreclosure, the mortgagee,
with the consent of the mortgagor, retains the property with no
foreclosure sale.68 The new statute makes this procedure considerably more attractive for mortgagees. Accordingly, its use could
increase appreciably.
Under the old law, the effect of consent foreclosure was simply
to reduce the post-foreclosure redemption period from six months
to three months for all parties, including judgment creditors of the
67. See I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 95, para. 57 (1985) (repealed).
68.

Pama. 15-1402(a).
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mortgagor, that had the right to redeem.6 9 Thus, a mortgagee who
took the property in lieu of a foreclosure sale could do little with it
until the redemption period ended. To achieve this reduction, the
mortgagee needed to obtain, after the foreclosure action had begun, the written consent of the mortgagor. The old law was silent
as to the mortgagee's ability thereafter to obtain a deficiency. The
assumption no doubt was that the mortgagor would consent to the
foreclosure only if the mortgagee took the property in full satisfaction of the debt. Other interested parties had no say in the foreclosure; their only recourse was to redeem the property after the
foreclosure by paying the full debt and accompanying expenses.
For the court, consent foreclosure operated mechanically.
Under the new statute, the process is more complex. Now the
mortgagee must expressly waive any right to a deficiency.70 In addition, the mortgagee must notify the other parties to the action
and give them a chance to object. If the parties are notified and do
not object, their interests are eliminated and they, like the mortgagor, have no right to redeem after entry of the judgment. If the
parties object, the court must conduct a hearing. At the hearing
the court has three options. The court can disallow the foreclosure
"for good cause shown" by the objecting party. In the absence of
good cause, the court can allow the objecting party thirty days to
redeem, with the foreclosure to occur after thirty days in the absence of redemption. Finally, the court can allow the foreclosure
to take place with no delay if the objecting party fails to show good
cause and fails to offer to redeem. The new statute sets forth a
process to handle redemptions in the event that two or more interested parties seek to redeem.7 '
The new consent procedure is more attractive than the old principally because it eliminates all redemption rights and thereby allows the mortgagee to take the property free and clear. Compared
to a foreclosure sale, the consent method is particularly attractive
because the mortgagor loses his six or seven month redemption
period that, under the new law, must expire before a foreclosure
sale can occur. 72 Under consent foreclosure, therefore, the mortgagee can obtain the property much more quickly and inexpensively.
For the court, however, the new hearing can provide troubles.
The new law is silent as to what sort of good cause must be shown
69.
70.
71.
72.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 12-127 and 12-132 (1985) (repealed in part).
Para. 15-1402(a).
Para. 15-1402(bX3).
See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
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and as to who carries the burden of proof. Typically a protesting
third party, such as a junior lienholder or judgment creditor, will
oppose the consent foreclosure because of the alleged high value of
the property in relation to the senior debt. The junior party will
claim that the property, if sold at a foreclosure sale, would bring
enough to yield residual proceeds for the junior claimants. The
foreclosing mortgagee will claim, to the contrary, that the value is
less than the senior lien and that a sale would be wasteful. The
court will be called upon to decide the matter.
Because the junior claimant is the one raising an objection to the
consent foreclosure, the junior claimant would seem to have the
burden of proving good cause. But this allocation of the proof burden seems awkward. The mortgagee and mortgagor, both of
whom would favor the consent foreclosure, might be better situated to offer proof about the valuation of the property, particularly
in comparison to a judgment creditor who may have no familiarity
with the real estate market and the real estate business. Additionally, doubts about the valuation should be resolved in favor of the
junior claimant, because a foreclosure sale, the remedy sought by
the objector, would eliminate the need to speculate. Perhaps the
best approach would be for courts to require the objecting party to
carry the burden of coming forward with primafacie evidence on
the value and then require the mortgagee to prove that the value is
less than the mortgage being foreclosed. If the "good cause" objection rests on a different ground, however, and is based on facts
known only to the objecting party, then allocating the burden to
the objecting party seems more reasonable. In any case, courts
should be quick to spot and to dismiss objections by junior claimants who simply seek to delay and harass.
Aside from consent foreclosure, the new act mentions two other
ways in which a mortgagee can obtain the property without a foreclosure sale. With the new act, Illinois statutory law for the first
time refers to strict foreclosure, the centuries-old method of foreclosure long abolished in virtually all states. The new act states
that it leaves undisturbed common law strict foreclosure "as in
existence in Illinois on the effective date of this Article. 7' 3 In strict
foreclosure, the court sets a date by which the defaulting mortgagor must cure the debt or lose the property to the mortgagee. No
sale is needed. By all accounts strict foreclosure is rarely used,
despite the existence of a recent appellate decision that expressly
sanctions the practice when the mortgagor is insolvent, the prop73.

Para. 15-1403.
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erty is worth less than the debt, and the mortgagee waives any deficiency. 4 The Illinois Supreme Court has not reassessed strict
foreclosure since state statutes first required judicial foreclosure decades ago, and the method's continuing validity remains in doubt.
In practice, a court is unlikely to allow strict foreclosure unless the
mortgagor has a reasonable chance to redeem. But when a reasonable redemption period is allowed and the above three requirements are satisfied, strict foreclosure seems consistent with the
legislatively expressed goal of reducing the costs and delays associated with foreclosure.
The new statute also refers for the first time to the common
practice of accepting a deed in lieu of foreclosure." Significantly,
the new law provides that the acceptance of a deed relieves the
mortgagor and all others, including guarantors, from personal liability on the debt unless a person agrees to remain liable at the time
of the deed. 6 As before, a deed in lieu of foreclosure does not
affect the rights of other persons who claim interests in the property, including claimants holding interests junior to that of the
mortgagee taking the deed. Because of this limit, a deed in lieu of
foreclosure usually is attractive only when no junior interests exist.
With junior interests present, consent foreclosure is the better
approach.
C.

The Plight of JuniorLessees

A third new role for judges in the foreclosure process is in deciding whether foreclosure will terminate the rights of parties who
hold leases that are junior to the lien being foreclosed. The old
equitable rule was that a foreclosure automatically terminated any
interest junior to the foreclosing lien, including a lease." The
holder of a junior interest was considered a necessary party to the
foreclosure proceeding. His joinder was mandatory, and his termination automatic.7 8 Equity also provided, however, that a junior
party who was omitted from the foreclosure was unaffected by it

because he had no chance to protect himself. This meant that a
74. See Great Lakes Mortgage Corp. v. Collymore, 14 Ill. App. 3d 68, 302 N.E.2d
248 (1st Dist. 1973).
75. Para. 15-1401.

76. Id.
77. The general rule is discussed in G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 3, at
§ 7.12. The confused Illinois law prior to the new Act is considered in Gearen, Vranicar
& Becker, Into Harms' Way: Now that Harms v.Sprague Has Establishedthe Lien Theory
of Mortgages in IllinoisDoes Foreclosure Cut OffJunior Leases or Can a Morgagee Elect
to Preserve Them?, 34 DE PAUL L. REV. 449 (1985).
78. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 3, at § 7.12.
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junior lease survived foreclosure if the lessee was omitted as a
party. 9 The question that arose in several states was whether a
mortgagee could intentionally omit a junior lessee and thereby
achieve the survival of a lease that the mortgagee found
advantageous.80
Illinois courts never examined the issues surrounding junior
leases, and the issues remained open. 81 The new act now resolves
them. The act virtually eliminates the concept of necessary parties
by requiring the mortgagee to join as defendants only those people
who are liable on the debt. 82 Junior claimants of all types can be
omitted. At the same time, the mortgagee has broad discretion to
join anyone interested in the property or in the debt, including any
guarantors on the note. 83 A person who is not joined as a party or
as a nonrecord claimant, however, is not bound by the judgment
and retains his interest in the property and his equitable redemption rights. Thus, the normal incentive to join all interested parties
remains.
The new act expressly allows a mortgagee to omit a junior lease
holder and thereby to ensure that the foreclosure has no effect on
the lease." By omitting a lessee, the mortgagee can maintain the
validity of an advantageous lease. On the other side, however, a
junior lessee under the act has the unqualified right to join on its
own motion.8 5 When this happens, the court's work begins. The
IMFL provides that a lessee's appearance in the action "shall not
result in the termination of the lessee's interest unless specifically
ordered by the court in the judgment of foreclosure. '8 6 In other
words, it is up to the court to decide whether the lease does or does
not survive. Unfortunately, the statute says no more. The statute
gives no guidance on the factors that courts should consider or the
test that they should apply.
In some cases the answer will be clear. The reason for the old
rule specifying termination of junior leases was to protect the mortgagee against leases entered into by the mortgagor, subsequent to
79. See Gearen, Vranicar & Becker, supra note 77, at 454.
80. The view of various states on this issue are considered in Gearen, Vranicar &
Becker, supra note 77, at 452-59.
81. See id. at 459-85.
82. Para. 15-1501(a).
83. Para. 15-1501(b).
84. Para. 15-1501(d).
85. Id.
86. Id. It is not clear from the statute whether this rule applies when the mortgagee
joins the junior lessee as well as when the lessee is omitted and joins on his own motion.
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the mortgage, at less than fair market value.17 In such a case, the
mortgagee should certainly be able to demand that the lease end.
On the other hand, sympathies shift to the lessee if the property
has deteriorated in condition or if the lessee has unsatisfied complaints against the lessor. The lessee in these instances perhaps
should have the right to terminate. If the mortgagee wants to continue the lease, the mortgagee, as new lessor, should be obligated to
respond fairly to past complaints.
Two common junior lease situations will prove difficult for
courts to resolve. One situation is when the lease terms are fair
when entered but later, because of changed conditions, become
clearly favorable to the lessee. The other situation is when the
lease terms are fair but the lessee has constructed costly leasehold
improvements and faces loss of the improvements if the lease is
terminated. In each case the lessee stands to lose, and the party
buying at the foreclosure sale is given a strong position to renegotiate a higher rent. If the new owner terminates the lease, the lessee
will have a valid claim against the old lessor for breach of its implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. 88 But this claim offers little solace if the old lessor is insolvent. A particularly cautious lessee also
might enjoy the protections of leasehold title insurance. But these
policies are rarely purchased, particularly by small businesses. In
the more common case, leasehold termination will cause the lessee
a sizeable loss. The court must decide whether the lessee will bear
the loss.
Although both situations involve similar losses for the lessee, it
is possible to distinguish them on equitable grounds. In the case of
expensive leasehold improvements, the foreclosure sale purchaser
(usually the mortgagee) stands to gain a windfall if he can terminate the lease or renegotiate above-market terms. If the lease is
already at fair rental value, the new owner should have little cause
to complain about the lease, and it seems unfair to empower the
lessor to force concessions from a lessee who wants to protect the
improvements and to avoid the disruptions of relocation. On the
other hand, the new owner has a complaint if the property taken
over is saddled with a below-market lease, even if the lease was fair
and honest when begun. In that case, the new owner should have
the power to terminate.
87. The competing interest of the mortgagee and lessee are considered in Gearen,
Vranicar & Becker, supra note 77.
88. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOCKBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.31 (1984).
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In these cases, courts should decide based on fairness to the parties. A new owner should have the unqualified option to discontinue a below-market lease, even if the lessee loses because of it.
The new owner, however, should not have the power to extract
concessions if the lease is fair. A new owner should have the right
to terminate a fair junior lease only in the special case in which the
owner wants to make use of the property personally. In close
cases, courts should favor the new owner over the lessee. After all,
the lessee knew or should have known of the mortgage when executing the lease. The mortgagee, on the other hand, likely had no
control over the terms of the junior lease. If the mortgagee possessed the contractual right to approve or disapprove the lease
when it was executed, a court might rightly be far more sympathetic to the lessee.
Courts should have an easier time dealing with the cases in
which the lessee is the one who wants to terminate the lease and
the new owner wants its continuance. 89 If the dispute simply is
financial, the new owner should be favored. The lessee typically
should have no reason to complain about a simple change in the
identity of the land owner-lessor, and should have no right to terminate an unfavorable lease simply because the first lessor has lost
the property. On the other hand, if the identity of the lessor is
important, a more difficult issue is presented. In general, a court
should require a lessee to continue a lease only if the new lessor is
willing and able to perform the lease fairly and fully. "Fairly and
fully" should mean that the lessor abides by all of the lease terms,
including purchase options granted to the lessee, and not just those
terms that "run with the land" under the old common law rules on
running covenants. 90 A new owner, therefore, should either accept
a lease entirely or reject it. The old rules on running covenants are
confused, dated, and little known today. Courts would do better to
ignore them and to fashion some compromise between the new
owner and lessee that makes sense on equitable grounds.
This new role for judges can be a burdensome one, with guide89. Some states take the view that foreclosure automatically terminates a junior lease,
even if the tenant is not joined, an approach that gives the mortgagee-probable purchaser
no options. See id. at 455-56. One suggestion has been that the junior lessee should have
the option of being bound by the lease or treating it as terminated. This approach, according to its proponents, "would tend to encourage pre-foreclosure settlement of lease
problems between the lessee and the mortgagee-probable purchaser and would discourage
manipulations of traditional foreclosure concepts." G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra
note 3, at § 7.12.
90. The rules on running covenants are considered in R. CUNNINGHAM, W.
STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 88, §§ 8.13 - 8.33.
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lines more or less nonexistent. Most courts, no doubt, will seek to
avoid the problem by pressuring the parties to negotiate a settlement. In this setting, modest pressure makes sense. But in the
end, courts must stand ready to resolve the dispute and to spend
the time necessary to achieve a fair result.

IV. THE NEW SALE PROCESS
The centerpiece of the new mortgage foreclosure act is the
lengthy new section describing the flexibility that courts now have
in setting the terms of the foreclosure sale. The new statute provides that the judgment of foreclosure can include, withoit limitation, the following terms: (1) a manner of sale other than public
auction; (2) who shall conduct the sale (if other than a judge or
sheriff); (3) provisions for exclusive and nonexclusive broker listings; (4) brokerage fees "to be paid out of the sale proceeds;"
(5) matters of exceptions to which title in the real estate may be
subject at the sale; (6) a requirement for title insurance;
(7) whether bids subject to contingencies will be allowed; and
(8) "other matters as approved by the court to ensure sale of the
real estate for the most commercially favorable price."91
The court's flexibility virtually is unlimited. The introductory
language to the section states that these special matters can be included in the judgment "if sought by any party in the complaint or
by separate motion."' 92 The section also states, however, that it
93
does not limit "the general authority and powers of the court.
The latter language suggests that courts have full flexibility in setting sale terms, even in the case of an uncontested foreclosure. A
court need not accept sale terms proposed by one party, and can
insert sale terms even if the foreclosing mortgagee seeks simply a
normal public auction on unconditional, cash terms.
The new law provides for the possibility that the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale will pay in installments if so authorized by the
judgment of foreclosure. 94 When the first installment is paid, the
purchaser receives a receipt, not a certificate of sale.95 Under section 15-1508, the court can confirm a sale even though the entire
purchase price has not yet been paid. At the time of confirmation
the purchaser is entitled to a certificate of purchase. Only when all
91. Para. 15-1506(f).
92. Id.

93. Id.
94. See Para. 15-1507(e) (by implication).
95. Id.
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of the purchase price has been paid can the purchaser claim a
deed.96
The possibility of installment payments creates the opportunity
for confusion and for possible unfair treatment of mortgagees.
Read literally, the statute seems to allow a court to approve a sale
on installments, even over the objection of the foreclosing mortgagee. If the price is paid in installments, the mortgagee will be
forced to wait for his money. At times the mortgagee might accept
this and even desire it, particularly if an installment sale presents
the only real opportunity to sell the property at a reasonable price.
In other settings, however, the mortgagee might object, especially
when the delay is substantial. What should a court do if a mortgagor proposes an installment sale at a high price, a price that will
generate some residual money for the mortgagor, and the mortgagee desires a quick cash sale that covers the mortgage debt but
returns nothing to the mortgagor? The issue will be a difficult one
to resolve, and the statute, as expected, provides no guidance.
Fairness, of course, will be the guiding principle, but it is a principle that often points vaguely. In all likelihood, courts will consider
seriously only installment options that provide for payment in a
year or less, absent the consent of the mortgagee.
Even when an installment period is short there will be tough
questions about who really owns the property while the installments are being paid. Three parties have plausible claims to ownership: the mortgagor, the mortgagee, and the purchaser. The
mortgagor's claim seems the weakest since a sale logically terminates all rights in the property except in the unusual case in which
there is a right to receive some of the future installments. The
mortgagee should retain an interest to the extent of the unpaid
debt. Illinois mortgage law, however, adheres to the lien theory of
mortgages, and never views the mortgagee as the owner of the
property.97 Almost by default, the purchaser's claim is likely to be
the strongest, even though the purchaser receives legal title only
after all the installments are paid. 9
Presumably the purchaser will be viewed as the owner, despite
the absence of legal title, at least if the purchaser has taken possession. But there must be limits to the purchaser's ownership. If the
96. Para. 15-1509(a).
97. See Harms v. Sprague, 105 Il1.2d 215, 473 N.E.2d 930 (1984); Gearen, Vranicar
& Becker, supra note 77, at 485-88.
98. Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the purchaser is considered the equitable owner of the property as soon as the contract is signed. See Shay v. Penrose, 25 Ill.
2d 447, 185 N.E.2d 218 (1962).
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purchaser voluntarily or involuntarily transfers any interest in the
property before completing payment, that interest should terminate in the event legal title does not transfer to the purchaser.
Other problems can also arise if the purchaser defaults on the installment contract, and a court will want to retain jurisdiction over
the action so that it easily can enter appropriate orders. Overall,
the problems are not insurmountable, but they likely will seem sufficiently imposing to discourage courts from approving contested
installment sales except in unusual cases.
One tricky issue that will arise relates to the use of brokers to
assist in bringing about a good sale price. Brokers typically want
brokerage contracts that guarantee them a commission if they produce a ready, willing, and able buyer, regardless whether the sale is
consummated. 99 What happens if, after a broker obtains a desirable bid, the court rejects the bid, or if before the bid is accepted the
mortgagor exercises his redemption right? Can the broker demand
a commission out of the ultimate sale proceeds, and must the mortgagor pay the commission as part of the expenses of redemption?
The statute is unclear, but the language dealing with commissions
does refer to payment out of the proceeds of the sale.100 Courts
might want to establish, as a rule, that all brokerage contracts used
must provide for payment of the commission only if the bid is accepted and the contract performed, with no commission due in
other circumstances.
Courts will also want to look over other terms of the brokerage
agreements as well as the process used to select brokers. Mortgagees who propose the use of brokers naturally will want to select
brokers they know and trust, but opportunities clearly exist for favoritism and for brokerage terms that unduly favor the broker. After all, the whole purpose of a sale is to provide a chance for the
defaulting mortgagor to recoup some of his equity if the sale proceeds exceed the debt. The mortgagee has no incentive to achieve a
sale at more than the debt, and might well be encouraged to aid a
friendly broker by agreeing to a brokerage commission with
slanted terms. Courts, therefore, should use care in approving the
use of brokers. They might want to announce, for example, that
brokerage contracts must both provide for listing of the property
with multiple listing services, if they exist, and allow for splitting
the commission fairly with selling brokerage firms.
99. See, e.g. United Investors, Inc. v. Tsotsos, 132 11. App. 3d 175, 477 N.E.2d 40
(1st Dist. 1985); Beider v. Eugene Matanky & Associates, Inc., 55 Ill. App. 3d 354, 371
N.E.2d 29 (1st Dist. 1977).

100.

Para. 15-1506(f)(5).
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This survey of the new sale process only begins to suggest the
problems that can arise when courts are vested with complete flexibility in setting the foreclosure sale terms. In reality, courts lack
the time to contemplate the best method of selling each parcel. Yet
courts cannot in fairness abdicate the task and consent to whatever
the mortgagee proposes absent some particularized objection by
the mortgagor. The court's primary roles are to supervise the process and to protect the interests of the mortgagor. If that job is not
done, the reason for judicial involvement disappears.
As noted above, Illinois could have joined the many states that
have chosen to allow private sales under power-of-sale foreclosure
clauses.' 0 1 That process saves time before the foreclosure sale, but
typically allows mortgagors the chance to complain if a sale is not
conducted fairly. 102 Mortgagees who conduct private sales do so as
quasi-trustees for the mortgagor, and their efforts are subject to
attack on numerous grounds after the sale if the process has turned
sour.10 3 Under the new Illinois statute, the mortgagor presumably
will have no cause to challenge the sale so long as it occurred according to the detailed order of foreclosure. If the process is to
work equitably, the court must perceive the problems in the stack
of filed papers and tailor a decree that will work. If this is not
done, the resulting process will be far worse than the private sale
option, upon which the legislature sought to improve.
One option for courts, and indeed for the entire Illinois judicial
system, will be to study the problem in general and engage in a bit
of de facto rulemaking Courts can fashion standard terms for
foreclosure sales, terms that they can follow in routine cases absent
some persuasive objection by a party. They can formulate standard sale decrees covering the principal different types of property
commonly sold at foreclosure sales, including such terms as acceptable brokerage terms, acceptable listing methods, and acceptable contingencies and financing terms. Standard decrees,
formulated in advance, can help handle the routine cases while saving time for those cases requiring greater scrutiny.
A further, more modest problem with the sale process is the apparent conflict between sections 15-1506 and 15-1507 of the new
act. The first section grants to courts the flexibility described
above. The latter section, however, states plainly that all property
shall be sold at a judicial sale (absent a consent foreclosure or strict
101.

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

102. See G.
103.

NELSON

& D. WHITMAN, supra note 3, §§ 7.1 - 7.32.

See id. §§ 7.21, 7.22.
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foreclosure), apparently in a traditional auction format. It seems
likely that section 15-1506 will be deemed to override section 151507, and that the section 15-1507 judicial auction procedures will
be followed only if not inconsistent with the specific sale procedures established by the court in the judgment of foreclosure.
V.

OTHER NEW CONFUSIONS

The new mortgage foreclosure act creates some further difficulties, largely unrelated to the new burdens placed on foreclosure
courts. These further difficulties are worthy of brief examination
before undertaking an assessment of the wisdom of the general direction that Illinois has taken in the new act.
A. Redemption Rights and Waivers
Aside from the new rules on foreclosure sales, the IMFL will be
noted most for the significant changes it makes in the redemption
rights of the various parties who claim interests in the foreclosure
property. To appreciate the changes, it is helpful to begin with a
review of the old redemption rules. Under the old scheme, the
mortgagor, and any other party who stood to lose an interest in the
property as a result of the foreclosure, could redeem the property
prior to the foreclosure sale under the equitable doctrine of redemption.' ° The statute did not regulate or even mention this equitable right and process. After the sale, the redemption rules were
more complex. Generally, all parties affected by the foreclosure
had six months after the sale in which to redeem.' 0 5 In certain rare
cases involving successive redemptions, the redemption period
could extend even further.0 In several ways the period could be
shortened:
(a) Waiver. If the mortgagor was a corporation or a corporate
trustee, the mortgagor could waive its redemption rights under two
statutory provisions. 0 7 The effect of the waiver was to bar all statutory redemption rights, except that a judgment creditor had a
right to redeem within three months after the sale.
(b) Deterioratedproperty. The mortgagee could shorten the redemption period by proving that the value of the property was less
104. See, e.g. First Nat'l Bank v. Hans, 143 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 493 N.E.2d 1171 (2d
Dist. 1986); G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 3, at § 7.2; Note, Foreclosures,Redemptions, and Homeowners, 1975 U. ILL. L. REV. 335, 337-39.
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 12-122 (1985) (repealed in part).
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-135 (1985).
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 12-124, 12-125 (1985) (repealed).
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than ninety percent of the unpaid debt and by agreeing to waive
any deficiency. 08 If this occurred, the redemption period for all
claimants was reduced to three months, except that judgment creditors still had six months in which to redeem.
(c) Consent foreclosure. A special rule applied when the mortgagor agreed to hand the property over to the mortgagee in full
satisfaction of the debt. In this case, all parties, including judgment creditors, had three months thereafter in which to redeem. 109
The new law has a similar scheme but contains shortened periods of redemption. For the most part, redemption periods run
before the foreclosure sale, which means that they are concurrent
with the old, and continuing, equitable rights of redemption. As
importantly, only the mortgagor has the redemption rights set
forth in the statute. The statutory rights formerly held by junior
lien holders, judgment claimants, and others have all been abolished, and these parties can now redeem only before the foreclosure sale by exercising their equitable redemption rights.
In general, the mortgagor's redemption right under the new law
extends until the later of (1) six months after commencement of the
foreclosure action and (2) three months after the judgment of foreclosure.110 In the case of a mortgage of property that is residential
at the time of the foreclosure, the six-month period is extended to
seven months."'1
These six and seven-month redemption periods, as noted, are
designed to run before the sale takes place. Section 15-1507, the
principal section dealing with sales, requires that the sale be
delayed until that time. The effect of this delay, however, is to
render the statutory redemption rights much less meaningful than
at first appears. Before the sale, mortgagors, and all other interested parties, have a right to redeem equitably. The statutory
right, then, gives them nothing that they did not already possess.
Only if the sale is held prematurely will these basic statutory rights
give the mortgagor a chance to redeem after the sale. Nonetheless,
the statutory rights are helpful in a limited way, for they have the
effect of delaying the foreclosure sale, even in uncontested cases.
Even if the mortgagor defaults in the action, the sale cannot occur
for six or seven months after the action is begun and three months
after the foreclosure decree is entered. The mortgagor, therefore,
108.
109.
110.
111.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 12-126 (1985) (repealed),
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 12-127 (1985) (repealed).
Para. 15-1603(b).
Id.
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has at least that long to redeem, whether the redemption is done
under the statute or under the older equitable right.
In two instances the six- or seven-month redemption period can
be shortened so that it terminates at the later of the end of the
reinstatement period and sixty days after the judgment of foreclosure. One instance is when the value of the property is less than
ninety percent of the amount required to redeem and the mortgagee waives all right to a deficiency. The other instance is when the
court finds that the mortgaged property has been abandoned.
The new law does create one special statutory right of redemption that extends beyond the foreclosure sale. Under section 151604, the mortgagor of residential real estate can redeem within
thirty days after confirmation of the foreclosure sale if (1) the
mortgagee bought at the sale, and (2) the sale was for less than the
112
amount needed to redeem.
One possible source of confusion under the new law is created by
the old provision in the civil procedure code that gave judgment
creditors the right to redeem the property." 3 This provision was
modified by the new law but not repealed. As modified, the section
states simply that a judgment creditor can redeem within three to
six months after a sale. Presumably, based on changes made to
other retained portions of the civil procedure code, that section is
now meant to have continued application only to sales conducted
as a result of judgment liens, and not to foreclosure sales conducted under the new law. If applied literally to foreclosure sales,
it seriously would disrupt the new law's aim of minimizing postsale redemption periods. The language of the section, however,
leaves considerable room for confusion.
The new law provides for the first time a procedure for a mortgagor to follow in exercising his right of redemption. Among other
steps, the mortgagor must give fifteen business days' notice of an
intent to redeem." 4 What is not clear is whether the notice merely
need be given within the statutory period or whether the redemption itself must occur within the time period. The statute is silent,
but it seems likely that courts will choose the former interpretation. It also is not clear whether the new procedures will apply
when a mortgagor or other party exercises an equitable right of
redemption. Since the statute almost entirely ignores the equitable
112.
113.
114.

Para. 15-1604(a).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 12-132 (1987).
Para. 15-1603(e).
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redemption right in all particulars,III it seems proper that this particular section should have no application to equitable redemptions, despite policy grounds that might counsel for an alternative
interpretation. Certainly a party should not be penalized for failing to follow the statutory redemption procedures until their applicability to equitable redemptions is established.
One of the most important new rules on redemption is a provi116
sion dealing with extensions and stays of the redemption period.
The new section states that a court cannot revive a statutory redemption period that has expired. It also states that any stay in the
enforcement of a foreclosure judgment or sale will not extend the
statutory redemption period. Yet, the section recognizes that a
court does have the power to stay the running of the redemption
period, and provides that a mortgagor will have at least a thirty
day redemption period after the stay ends.' 1 7 The statute is silent
as to the grounds upon which a court may rely in issuing a stay.
Despite its brevity and superficial complexity, the section conveys
a clear meaning: courts can exercise their equitable rights to delay
a sale if appropriate, but they cannot interfere with a sale once it
has taken place. II Clearly the desire of the drafters was to eliminate any chance of post-sale redemptions 19 in hopes that the foreclosure sale then would bring a higher price. With this goal in
mind, courts presumably should be reluctant to revive an equitable
redemption right after a sale has taken place, although the statute
does not appear to restrict their ability to do so when equity demands it.
The new law expands considerably the circumstances in which a
mortgagor can waive his rights of redemption and reinstatement.
The new scheme has differing rules based on whether the property
is residential, agricultural or other. In the case of residential property, a mortgagor can waive both his redemption and reinstatement
rights if a foreclosure action has begun and the mortgagee has
115. The statute refers to the equitable redemption right only once. See Para. 151605 (noting that the equitable right of redemption cannot be enforced after the foreclosure takes place).
116. Para. 15-1605(c).
117. Para. 15-1605(c)(2). Under the old law, courts claimed the right to allow redemption after the statutory period expired when equity seemed to require it. See, e.g.,
MutualLife Ins. Co. of New York v. Chambers, 88 Il. App. 3d 952, 410 N.E.2d 962 (1st
Dist. 1980).
118. A court can interfere by staying the tolling of the special 30-day post-sale re-

demption period for certain residential mortgagors.
119. The drafters did, as noted, provide for a brief post-sale redemption right for
certain residential mortgagors. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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waived all rights to a deficiency.120 With agricultural property, the
mortgagor can waive his redemption rights in the same circumstances as the residential mortgagor; in addition, waiver is permissible if the mortgagor is a corporation or a trust run by a corporate
trustee.' 2' In all other cases, waiver of redemption rights freely is
allowed, either in the mortgage or later. 12 2 Presumably a waiver is
binding on a mortgagor's successors and assigns, although the express language on this point contained in the old law 23 was not
reiterated.
The new rules on waiver, although largely clear and understandable, are in two respects beset by serious interpretive difficulties.
The first is that the statute is silent on the ability of nonresidential
mortgagors to waive their reinstatement rights. The absence of express authority to waive suggests that no power to do so exists, at
least prior to commencement of the foreclosure action, but this issue is unclear. More importantly, the statute does not seem to
have any application to the waiver of equitable rights of redemption. On its face, the statute is unclear on whether a valid waiver
under the statute operates to release equitable, as well as statutory,
rights. The old law expressly stated that the waivers being authorized were waivers of redemption "from sale," meaning that they
had no application to equitable rights operating before the foreclosure. 24 The new law deletes the words "from sale," a deletion that
arguably should be given meaning. Yet courts so strongly favor
redemptions and so jealously guard redemption rights that the statute probably will be given a narrow reading, and only statutory
rights will be eliminated.
If this interpretation is correct, the new waiver rules at first
glance seem to be surplus, except for the portions dealing with
waivers by residential mortgagors and waivers of reinstatement
rights. As noted, only certain residential mortgagors have a right
to redeem after a foreclosure sale. 25 Thus, nonresidential mortgagors seemingly have given up nothing by waiving the statutory
rights of redemption because they still can redeem equitably during
the same period. By waiving, that is, the nonresidential mortgagor
has simply released one of two concurrent redemption rights. If
waivers were indeed this meaningless in such a broad category of
120.
121.

Para. 15-1601(c).
Para. 15-1601(b), (c).

122.
123.
124.
125.

Para. 15-1601(b).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10, paras. 12-124, 12-125 (1985) (repealed).
Id.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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cases, courts might be prone to reinterpret the statutory section on
waivers so that it applies to equitable as well as statutory redemption rights. By doing so, they would be vesting the section with
greater meaning.
In fact, however, applying the waiver provision only to statutory
redemption rights does not make sense. A waiver of statutory redemption rights does have an effect: It removes the requirement,
contained in section 15-1507, that the sale be delayed for at least
six or seven months. When statutory redemption rights are
waived, the sale can occur more quickly, even though the mortgagor retains full rights to redeem equitably until the sale. In this
light, the suggested interpretation makes considerable sense, and
courts should feel confident in embracing it.
No similar interpretive difficulties arise in the case of waivers of
reinstatement rights, for these waivers do have obvious effects. Reinstatement rights are entirely a product of the statute.1 26 When
they are waived, no equitable rights exist to fill the gap, and the
mortgagor is left only with the right to redeem.
B. Guarantors
For the first time, mortgagees now can join guarantors of the
secured debt in the foreclosure action and obtain deficiency judgments against them.1 27 Joinder is optional, and the guarantor must
be named in a separate count in the complaint. In most parts of
the state, joinder will save time and expense by eliminating any
need for the mortgagee to bring a separate action against the
guarantor.
One problem that will arise when guarantors are joined stems
from the guarantor's right to demand a jury trial on the issue of
liability.' 28 In foreclosure actions, juries are not used, and many
courts in foreclosure actions are not equipped to empanel juries.
The problem is particularly clear in Chicago, where law and chancery matters are heard by separate judges and where foreclosure
actions frequently are adjudicated in courtrooms that lack the
physical space for jurors.
The drafters of the new statute anticipated this difficulty, but
concluded that the courts could find solutions. Procedures differ
126. See G. NELSON & D. WHrYMAN, supra note 3, at § 7.7.
127. Para. 15-1501(b)(5).
128. See Abingdon State Bank & Trust Co. of Abingdon v. Bulkeley, 312 Ill. App.
16, 37 N.E.2d 873 (1941). Under prior law, a personal judgment could not be entered
against a guarantor in a foreclosure action. See Farmer City State Bank v. Champaign
Nat'l Bank, 138 11. App. 3d 847, 486 N.E.2d 301 (lst Dist. 1985).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

considerably around the state, and the best procedural method for
respecting the guarantors' jury trial right could vary. In Chicago,
chancery judges likely will sever counts brought against guarantors
and refer them to the law courts to adjudicate. Because actions at
law in Chicago are far slower in coming to trial, claims against
guarantors likely will remain unresolved at the time of the foreclosure sale. Elsewhere, judges might well empanel a jury to resolve
the issues on which a jury trial right exists, either before or after
the trial on the main foreclosure issues. Whatever procedure is
used, judges will need to ensure that they do not resolve issues in
chancery in such a way as to deprive the guarantor of his constitutional jury trial right.
C. Future Advances Lending
The new statute also undertakes to resolve some of the complicated issues that are generated when a lender makes future advances on a loan that is secured by a mortgage. 129 The principal
question that arises is whether the later advances have a priority as
30
of the date of the mortgage or as of the date that they are made.
This question arises often in construction lending, and will arise
more frequently in the future given the rising popularity of "homeequity" mortgages that secure revolving credit lines.
The principal pre-existing Illinois statute on the subject provides
that a future advance will take priority from the date of the mortgage only if the advance occurs within eighteen months of the
mortgage or if the advance is made pursuant to a commitment
made by the lender during this period. 13 By enacting this statute,
Illinois joined the ranks of the states that distinguish between advances that are optional with the lender and those that are obligatory.' 3 2 The Illinois statute is quite distinct, however, in that it
gives an early priority to all advances made during the eighteen
month period, even if optional.
The new statute builds on this older statute. The new act states
clearly that advances made more than eighteen months after a
mortgage is recorded are a lien as to subsequent purchasers and
129.
130.
interest
131.

Para. 15-1302.
The date that the advances are made will often be after intervening liens and
have attained, particularly mechanics' liens.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, para. 37(a) (1985). This statute is ably considered in

Benfield, The Future Advances Lender: Status Under Present Illinois Law and Under
ULTA and USOL TA, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 451, 455-59.

132.

See G.

131, at 453-54.

NELSON

& D.

WHrrMAN,

supra note 3, at § 12.7; Benfield, supra note
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judgment creditors only from the time such monies are advanced
and are applied unless made pursuant to a commitment.' 33 The
eighteen-month general rule of retroactive priority applies only as
against "subsequent purchasers and judgment creditors,"'' 34 which
means, apparently, that it provides no priority guidance when the
intervening interest is held by a secured lender or a mechanics lien
claimant. This omission will continue to trouble lenders. In one
respect the act does add a helpful clarification. It states that an
advance made after the eighteen-month period will be considered
an obligatory advance made pursuant to a commitment only if the
commitment is entered into in the mortgage or in a separate instru35
ment contemporaneous with and referred to in the mortgage.'
Under the old statute, it seemed possible that the commitment to
advance more money could be made at any time during the initial
36
eighteen-month period.'
The new future advances section specifies several important situations in which optional advances made more than eighteen
months after recordation will relate back in priority to the date of
original recordation. Monies advanced under a reverse mortgage 37 or under a revolving credit arrangement' 38 will be a lien
from the date that the mortgage is recorded, even though they occur more than eighteen months after recordation. The statute does
not so provide, but presumably the advances will retain this early
priority only if the total secured indebtedness remains below the
maximum loan amount specified in the recorded mortgage. The
recorded mortgage should serve to put later lenders on notice as to
the maximum amount of indebtedness secured by the mortgage.
In light of this notice rationale, a lender should be unable to increase the maximum amount of a credit line or alter the terms of a
reverse mortgage, and then claim that the increased indebtedness
should all hold a priority of the original recordation date. If a different rule applied, a mortgagor who executed a revolving credit or
reverse mortgage loan would find that no lender was willing to take
a junior mortgage on the property, regardless of the apparent
133.

Para. 15-1302(a).

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
See Benfield, supra note 131, at 456-59.
Para. 15-1302(b)(2). A reverse mortgage is a mortgage in which the outstanding

principal increases for a period of time because the mortgagor during the period pays less
than the amount of accruing interest.

138. Para. 15-1302(b)(3). A revolving credit arrangement is a situation in which the
mortgage secures a maximum loan amount or line of credit that the borrower typically
can draw upon and repay repeatedly during the loan term.
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amount of the mortgagor's equity. A prospective lender will view
a junior mortgage as worthless so long as the principal amount of
the senior mortgage can be increased at will.
As further exceptions to the eighteen-month rule on optional advances, the new act provides that the recordation date is the priority date for all interest that accrues on the loan, 139 as well as for all
monies advanced by the mortgagee (1) to preserve or restore the
or
mortgaged real estate, (2) to preserve the lien of the mortgage
14°
the priority of the lien, or (3) to enforce the mortgage.

D. Nonrecord Claimants
The new statute largely continues the old procedure by which a
mortgagee could bind known holders of unrecorded interests in the
mortgaged property.141 A mortgagee could bind these nonrecord
claimants to the results of a foreclosure action simply by sending
notice of the action to their last known address. The mortgagee
was not required to join them personally as defendants nor was he
required to make a diligent search to determine their present loca42
tions. Under the new law, the same process can be followed.
The lack of any change in this process is surprising, because the
process is now subject to substantial constitutional challenge under
the 1983 United States Supreme Court decision, Mennonite Board
of Missions v. Adams. 43 Due process now requires that a diligent
effort be made to send notice to any person whose interest in foreclosed property will be lost as a result of a foreclosure action. In
the absence of a diligent search, a nonrecord claimant might well
assert successfully that his interest is unaffected by a statutorily
correct foreclosure action.
VI.

CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE NEW JUDICIAL ROLES

On its face, the new Illinois mortgage foreclosure act places important demands on judges handling foreclosure actions. Many of
the demands are new; others are held over from the prior statute.
Judges must determine when foreclosure under the new law is required, particularly in cases involving installment land contracts
139. Para. 15-1302(b)(4).
140. Para. 15-1302(bX5).
141. Paras. 15-1210, 15-1502. The old rules were set forth at ILL. REV.
110, paras. 15-105 - 15-107 (1985) (repealed).
142. Para. 15-1502.

STAT.

ch.

143. 462 U.S. 791 (1983) (notice by publication and posting fails to provide mortgagee with minimum notice required by the Fourteenth Amendment in a proceeding to sell
mortgage real estate for nonpayment of taxes).
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and collateral assignments of beneficial interests in Illinois land
trusts. They must decide when a mortgagor who has exercised the
right to reinstate can reuse that right within the following five-year
period. They must decide when consent foreclosure can proceed
over the objections of the holder of a junior interest in the property. They must decide when foreclosure will terminate a lease
that is junior to the mortgage being foreclosed. They must decide
when reinstatement rights can be waived and when reinstatement
and redemption periods should be stayed. They must decide how
best to protect a guarantor's constitutional right to a jury trial
without unduly complicating the foreclosure process. And, they
must decide the enigmatic priority issues that arise out of future
advances lending. They must do all of these things, and they must
do them with essentially no statutory guidance.
Above all else, however, judges now must implement the important new rules that give them flexibility in determining how foreclosure property should be sold. They must determine when
property should be listed with a broker and when financing and
title contingencies should be accepted. They must decide when a
private auctioneer will be helpful, and when an installment sale
makes the best sense. They can, of course, sit back and await
prompting by mortgagees and the occasional mortgagor. They can
insert novel sale terms only when and as proposed by one party or
the other. But the act will best serve its function if judges take a
more active role. Foreclosure sales will bring the most money only
if judges take an active interest in the process and devise sale methods that can achieve that goal.
Realistically, these burdens on judges may be excessive, particularly in counties in which the foreclosure burden is heavy. Judicial
time is tight, and the judicial temperament is inclined to resolve
only those specific issues presented by the parties. If the parties do
not object to a traditional auction, the auction likely will occur. If
a parcel is best sold by a broker or subject to a title insurance commitment, perhaps the parties should so determine and advise the
court. Judges are not in the real estate marketing business, and,
even with strong market knowledge, reasonably cannot examine
the attributes of each foreclosed parcel and tailor the sale process
accordingly.
Perhaps at bottom the issue raised by the new foreclosure sale
rules is whether lending institutions will step forward in foreclosure actions and use the new sale methods in ways that benefit hapless mortgagors. Will mortgagees actually use the new sale

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

processes to push up sale prices? Evidence will soon provide an
answer to these questions, but it is reasonable to assume that some
change will occur. Mortgagees are the first to benefit when foreclosure sales approach market prices. Once they gain familiarity with
the new range of options, self-interest should motivate them to act
flexibly and to tailor sale procedures sensibly. But the self-interest
of mortgagees can only move the process so far. Mortgagors are
most at risk when their property, if properly sold, could bring them
some return of equity. And it is precisely in this situation, however
atypical, that a mortgagee will be most content with a traditional
auction at which the mortgagee can buy the property at the price
of the debt. Property in hand, the foreclosing mortgagee can sell it
and retain the profits. Realistically, perhaps, mortgagors will benefit from the new sale methods only if possessed of the savvy and
resources needed to look after themselves. They must engage competent legal counsel to push for more vigorous sales methods. In
the absence of pushing, judges will be inclined by the rush of business to do little.
As lawyers and mortgage lenders work with the new act, foreclosure sales might yield higher prices, and more foreclosure property might pass directly to buyers other than mortgagees. If
evidence of this type accumulates, the legislature presumably will
call its experiment in flexibility a success. But it is hard to imagine
that mortgagors will benefit except in the unusual case. Deficiency
judgments might dwindle a bit, but mortgagors likely will find
foreclosure checks in their mailboxes no more often than today. If
gain comes from the act, mortgagees can expect to receive the bulk
of it.
In the end, mortgagees are unlikely to act unilaterally in a way
that merely aids the mortgagor. Mortgagors must protect themselves, and must do so before the foreclosure sale occurs. They
must take advantage of the new sale methods, and must push for
sale terms and procedures that will enhance recovery. If mortgagors do not do so, they can hope only that judges will find the time
to help them. They can hope only that judges will expend the effort to examine generally the foreclosure sale process and to develop sale methods that can increase sale prices. They must hope
that judges will act unilaterally and speak out when auctions seem
particularly ill-suited to bring a fair yield. If judges can scrape together the time to do this, the new act might achieve the legislature's goals and yield benefits for the many mortgagors unable
fairly to defend themselves.

